

2nd INTERNATIONAL TAMIL CONFERENCE

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SUPPLEMENTARY CONFERENCE PAPERS

என் நாட்டுச் சகோதரனே

செக்கச் சிவந்த செங்குருதியில்
எம் செம்மண்ணைப் பாலூட்டி
போராட்டப் பொழுதினில் - அந்த
சிங்கார 'சுதந்திரப் பறவைகளை'
தட்டித் திறந்து விட்டது
ஈழ மாதாவின் கண்ணீர் துடைக்கவே!

புதுக்கப் புகுந்தவர்கள் - இங்கு
புலியின் குகையினுள்
புள்ளி மான்கள் உறுமக்கண்டு
மருட்சி கொண்டு ஓடியது
எங்கள் மண்ணின் மங்கையர்
மன உறுதிக்கு மறுசாட்சி.....!

தற்காலத் தவிப்பினில் - இவர்களுக்கு
தாகமே வருவதில்லை
எக்காலமும் இவர்களை - இப்படி
எழுந்து சென்று அணைக்குமா?

விடுதலைக்கு சூழ் கொடுத்தனர்
சுதந்திரத்தில் இளைப்பாற - நாம்
ஆவலுடன் பார்த்திருக்க - பாவம்
இவர்கள் வருங்காலம் என்றும்
விகிதாசாரத்தில்..... ஆம் என்றும்
இங்கு பத்திற்கு ஒன்றுதான்!

நண்பா இங்கு வேண்டும்
ஓர் புரட்சி - இல்லையென்றால்
சரித்திரத்தின் முதுகினில் - நாளை
தரித்திரம் தான் சவாரி செய்யும்!

ஓ ஈழமாதாவே.....!
உன் சமுதாயத்தின் அழகிப்போன
சம்பிரதாய நாவிற்கு - உன்
பெண்களையா உரமாக்குகிறாய்?

சகோதரனே! சத்தியம் செய்துவிடு
ஈழத்துடன் இவர்கள் வாழ்வையும் - இல்லையென்றால்
அவர்களை வருங்காலம் விமர்சிக்கும்
'விலைபோகா சரக்குகள்'.....!!

-இரா ஸ்ரீரங்கன்-
கோலாலம்பூர்

TAMIL REFUGEES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

by V Varathakumar, Co-ordinator, Tamil Refugee Action Group, London

Dear delegates,

I shall limit my concerns only to the Tamil Refugees who have sought asylum in the UK, their refugee life in Britain and their future.

INTRODUCTION

Tamils faced the worst of the violence in 1983. It was only in July 1983 the rest of the world took notice of the oppression of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. I must stress here that the Tamil problem should not be assumed to have started only in July 1983. The political, economic and military measures directed against the Tamil people started with the grant of independence to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in 1948 and they continue to exist today.

BACKGROUND

The first reason for the Tamils' fear is that, ever since the 1958 communal violence, the 'pearl of the Indian Ocean' has become a land of persecution and atrocities against the Tamils. The intervals between the episodes of violence that occurred from time to time became shorter, and incidences of violence wider and more intense.

Secondly, it is estimated that as many as 16,000 Tamils have been killed, about 14,000 injured, over 1,000 Tamils have 'disappeared', and more than 2,000 women have lost their husbands due to inconsiderate military operations. According to a World Bank Report published on November 6, 1987, almost 100,000 Tamil families had lost their homes - that is, before the toll of the Indian Peace Keeping Force had been assessed.

Thirdly, since 1981, the human rights situation in the country has deteriorated rapidly. During 1984 and 1985 alone more than 70 Tamil villages in Trincomalee in the Eastern Province were destroyed by the Security forces during their ruthless military operations. People were driven out of their homes with a view to colonise the areas with Sinhalese settlers in order to alter the ethnic ratio in these areas.

Fourthly, as of 10th July 1987, there were 336,545 recorded Tamil refugees in the different districts of the North and East of Sri Lanka, and the Tamils had not been spared even after they were made refugees. There were reports of attacks on the refugee camps during military operations.

THE ACCORD OF 1987

Then came the ludicrous Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord signed on 29th July 1987 between the Sri Lankan and Indian Governments, apparently to bring peace to the Island by solving the racial conflict. The interesting aspect of this Accord is that the aggrieved party in the conflict was not made a party to the Accord!

The 'Peace' Accord did not bring any peace to anyone at all. Instead, it brought more misery to everybody in the island of Sri Lanka and caused more divisions between communities and within communities than what was prevailing in the pre-Accord period. It could be said that every single Tamil in the Northern and Eastern Provinces was affected during the October 1987 Indian military onslaught. More

than 3,000 persons had been killed and billions of rupees worth of properties had been damaged. A large number of women were raped and thousands of Tamil youths were arrested and tortured. It is said that the number of 'disappearances' ran into hundreds.

Many Tamils also fled the country because of rivalry among Tamil militant groups fostered by India as a matter of deliberate policy (exactly as she had done in Bangladesh during and after the Bangladesh war of independence) to divide and rule the Tamils and also because of the pressure brought to bear on them to join the militant groups. It is significant and important to note that the Tamils never intended to leave their homeland. And it is only the holocaust of the July/August 1983 violence that forced the Tamils to uproot themselves and move away from their moorings, aimlessly and hopelessly. Large numbers of them fled to India by boat and others fled to countries like Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Holland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany. Some came to Britain also not knowing what was in store for them here.

Available data indicate that 5,385 Tamils, men, women and children, have come to UK and have applied for asylum. By comparison, in France more than 20,000 Tamils were allowed to enter and remain there. There are more than 27,000 Tamil refugees in West Germany. Recent reports from Canada and Australia reveal that there has been a significant increase in the number of Tamils arriving there following the Indian military atrocities on the Tamil people in the North and East of Sri Lanka. It may be noted that only a small number of Tamils came to Britain after the signing of the so-called Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord.

PLIGHT OF TAMILS IN THE UK

Tamil refugees, however, have a special place in British immigration practice. The Tamil issue is not confined to Britain alone; it is an issue which is connected with much wider implication of European attitude to immigration from outside Europe. All attempts by refugees' advocates to safeguard the rights of the refugees have led to widely exaggerated and misleading statements from the Home Office.

There are claims of "floods" of refugees and "bogus" and "economic" refugees. The British Government arbitrarily makes statements about refugees, branding them as bogus. These statements are not only untrue, but also have the effect of fuelling racism. If there is a category of "refugee who is not genuine", then the government must be requested to define the terms "genuine refugees" and "refugees who are not genuine".

You may recall, in the case of 64 Tamils who arrived in Britain from Bangladesh in February 1987, 6 were allowed to enter and 58 were refused entry. They were declared "manifestly bogus refugees", and were scheduled for return to Bangladesh. There was clear evidence at that time that

the situation in Sri Lanka, particularly in the North and East, was appalling and Tamils were not safe there and that they were fleeing from there. But the Government of Britain refused to see reason. Much emphasis was placed on their forged documentation and their manner of travel and arrival into UK to cloud the issue and to give the impression that these reasons would invalidate their claim for asylum. The UNHCR specifically asked the Home Secretary not to return them to Bangladesh as they would almost inevitably be repatriated to Sri Lanka. But, the government did not heed their advice.

The government was also informed of what the (then) Sri Lankan Minister of National Security, Lalith Athulathmudali, had uttered at a press conference in Colombo on 4 October 1984. He said, "All Tamil refugees returning to Sri Lanka from countries where their requests for refugee status have been refused would be arrested on arrival in Colombo".

It was even pointed out that the British Government may be knowingly sending the Tamils to Sri Lanka to be arrested, tortured and even killed, in violation of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees. The evidence of what happened to the 24-year old Thurairajah in the hands of the Police when he was removed to Colombo was conveyed by the Swiss officials. But once again they were deaf to logic.

Meanwhile, a statement documenting 17 cases of torture amongst this group of 58 Tamils was sent to the Home Office. And an independent doctor examined six of them while they were under detention at Foston Hall and verified their claims that they had been tortured. It was only two days before the full Judicial review that the Home Secretary conceded that the Tamils' claim would be reviewed, and that representations could be made on their behalf. He also conceded that it is incorrect to imply that the manner of travel and arrival discredits a person's claim for asylum, and that the point at issue is whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution, if he were to be returned home.

After conceding the above, the government then relapsed into the old mood and began to adopt harsher procedures to stop Tamil refugees coming to Britain. Even when Britain had received far fewer fleeing Tamils than many other European countries had, it imposed stricter visa requirements in 1985 to prevent them arriving here at all. The immediate effect of it was to reduce the number of Tamils arriving in Britain, but the long-term plan was to extend it to other black Commonwealth and ex-Commonwealth countries as well.

ATTITUDE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE REFUGEES

In 1987, with the arrival of the much smaller group of 64 Tamils, the government managed to introduce the Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act which made it more difficult for Tamil refugees to come to Britain.

In addition, the government looked for further deterrents to prevent Tamil refugees from entering the UK. They had come up with prolonged detention, harsh port procedures, summary removal of asylum seekers even while their cases

were under consideration by the courts, attacks on MP's rights to intervene, and curtailment of UKIAS' access to asylum-seekers, as further additions to prevent the arrival of refugees.

Hence, it appears to us that the aim of government action on refugees has been solely exclusive. The issue has not been about whether the Tamils, or any other asylum-seekers, are genuinely in danger in their homeland, but about how they can be prevented from fleeing to the UK as a result of that fear.

The harsh port procedures, summary removal of asylum-seekers and detention, have enormous psychological impact on the life of these refugees. They feel that they are undesirable in this country where they thought they would be provided sanctuary and allowed to start a new life free from repression and persecution. Most of them live in fear of forcible return to Sri Lanka.

HOUSING PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES

Housing is another large problem for non-government programme refugees like the Tamils. The precarious position of refugees in housing makes them even more vulnerable and they are completely unable to start planning for a new life in exile. There are complaints about racial harassment, exploitation and discrimination in housing.

They also often have difficulties in claiming benefits. There are long delays and doubts about entitlements, especially for asylum-seekers who have not had a 'decision' from the Home Office. Then there are doubts about the formalised links between the DHSS and the Home Office. It is often found that the DHSS and Health Services do not understand the plight of refugees, but rather act as monitoring agencies for the Home Office.

HEALTH HAZARDS OF REFUGEES

There is also a high rate of mental disorders due to threat of deportation, overall feeling of insecurity and problems of adaptation. Many of the recent arrivals, particularly those who had fled from Indian military atrocities in Sri Lanka have shown extremely traumatic expression when they arrive in the UK. A large number of them have come direct from detention camps and have experienced different forms of physical and psychological torture and persecution.

Home sickness and worry is a cause of psychological stress. Racism and the lack of understanding on the part of those in the new environment also contribute to the high incidence of mental disorder among refugees.

There was an incident a few weeks ago in Ilford where a 22-year-old Tamil refugee girl, Ranjini, who was married in 1987, had committed suicide because of depression.

EXODUS TO CANADA

It is also true that there are several Tamils who after applying for asylum in Britain have fled to Canada during the last 10 months because of uncertainty of their future in Britain. There are few others who had attempted to flee to Canada

but were stopped and either removed to Sri Lanka or have been locked up in detention centres here. Today there are about 13 Tamils detained in known Detention Centres in London.

RIGHTS OF THE REFUGEES

It is said that 33 Tamils have been granted full refugee status so far, and 3,727 asylum-seekers have been granted 'Exceptional Leave'. The rights of those with exceptional leave to remain are, of course, far less than those with refugee status. This limits the obligation which the government then has to the person who gains leave to remain in that fashion.

It is important here to note that exceptional leave to remain is granted wholly at the discretion of the Secretary of State. Therefore, there is no right of appeal against the refusal of exceptional leave. Further, those with exceptional leave to remain do not have an automatic right to family reunion.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and both International Covenants protect family unity. And the above restriction clearly violates those international instruments both in letter and spirit.

There are more than 250 Tamils who are on 'Temporary Admission'. They live as cliff-hangers, with uncertainty. This develops a psychological and mental pressure on them. The long delay in deciding their cases and the length of temporary admission increase the anxiety about their future. Most of these refugees on temporary admission are youths between 17 and 25. Several of them abandoned their higher education and came to Britain. The new regulations do not allow them to continue with their full-time studies or to seek employment. They are confused and bored. Discrimination is a common experience for them. Some of them have even drifted into drugs and petty crimes.

DEPORTATION OF REFUGEES

It is said that nearly 60 Tamils have been deported up to now and 57 of them during 1988 alone. It is hard to monitor the movements of the Tamils removed to Sri Lanka from here. Most of them however are reported to be in hiding and some are suffering in Colombo. Some have fled to Canada, and

the whereabouts of others are not known. We have also received unconfirmed reports suggesting that a young Tamil named Rasiah Sakthivel, removed in 1987, has since been killed. Confirmed reports about Kirupakaran and Nalliah Selvakumar who were removed to Sri Lanka in July 1988 state that they narrowly escaped death. Selvakumar was arrested by the IPKF and was severely tortured.

Meanwhile, the IPKF, the Indian and Sri Lankan Governments and the government media from both countries are now trying to portray that the situation in Sri Lanka is now back to 'normal'. This is far from the truth. Fear still stalks through the Island. The killings and disappearances occur almost daily in all parts of Sri Lanka.

IS SRI LANKA A SAFE PLACE TO RETURN ?

The government's decision to provide two revolvers to each candidate contesting the last February general elections was an acknowledgement that the law and order situation in the entire country is far from normal. It is estimated that the number of persons killed including the Indian military personnel, Sri Lankan security forces, Tamil and Sinhalese militants and Tamil and Sinhalese civilians during 1988 amounted to more than 5,000.

The number of persons killed during 1989 so far is estimated to be in the range of 700 and the situation has further deteriorated recently following the general elections, and this is expected to continue if nothing is done to stop it.

HOW LONG IN GREAT BRITAIN ?

Meanwhile, there is a growing concern over the plight of Tamil refugees in Britain, particularly those who are on temporary admission. It is possible that they may all be termed "Economic Refugees", described as bogus, charged with criminal offences and removed to Sri Lanka before the political conflict there is settled satisfactorily.

A pertinent question we may ask here is, if the Refusniks and Jews and Russian Christians arrive in UK from the USSR with forged documentation, would they be charged with criminal offences?!

saviour and protector makes the Indian action cruel and morally reprehensible. Although the non-perfectionist approach is a realistic one it cannot be vulgarised into a cynical, amoral stance. This type of approach seemingly oblivious of ethical and moral constraint is described as 'vulgar realism'. In 1986 an Indian diplomat told a Colombo gathering "There is no morality in politics". That statement characterises India's approach in dealing with the Sri Lankan situation particularly the Tamils. The dubious means employed, the destructive course of action, the use of military force exceeding notions of proportionality etc., are all symptoms of the non-perfectionist approach being used in practice as a distorted course of 'vulgar realism'.

It is pertinent to recall that when American war policies in Vietnam were criticised a severe case in point was that they grossly violated the principle of proportionality. The military means employed by U.S. forces and the enormous destruction caused were felt to be out of any conceivable proportion to the American interests involved. This view was held even by those who were not totally opposed to U.S. objectives.

Indian military activity in the areas described as Tamil Eelam and related diplomatic action has to be seen in this context where a strong argument could be made that India has been neither prudent nor proportional in exercising force.

BUNGLED CO-ERCIVE DIPLOMACY

The strategy adopted by India towards Sri Lanka on the whole amounts to compellance or coercive diplomacy. This strategy employs threats or limited force to persuade an opponent to call off or undo an action. Indian actions vis-a-vis the Jayewardene government were in the early stages on strategy relying more on deterrence. (The Feb 1987 Demarche, the Mar visit of Dinesh Singh). This strategy employs threats to dissuade an opponent from undertaking an action that he has not yet initiated (the offensive on the Jaffna Peninsula). After the Vadamaratchi operation the strategy was compellance. The act of dropping food by air is a clear and remarkable act of coercive diplomacy. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was proof of India's diplomatic victory as Jayewardene capitulated.

The Indian relationship with the LTTE was also an attempt enmeshed in a web of co-ercive diplomacy. In this case the endeavour was not blatant as in the case of the air-drop. Unlike the case with Mr Jayewardene the strategy back-fired with Mr Prabaharan. The reasons are not far to seek. Coercive diplomacy is different from coercion. The former seeks to persuade the opponent while the latter aims at stopping him through sheer force. Coercive diplomacy emphasises the use of threats and exemplary use of limited force to persuade the opponent to back down. This strategy proffers the opportunity of achieving one's objective without much bloodshed and very little or no risk of escalating violence. However beguiling the strategy is the fundamental flaw is the strong temptation it affords statesmen and leaders of powerful countries that they could by employing this strategy with little risk, intimidate weaker opponents into giving up their gains and objectives. If the opponent despite his weakness **refuses**

to be threatened and effectively calls the bluff of the coercing power, the latter must then decide whether to back off himself or to escalate the use of force.

In the case of the LTTE the basic coercive premise on which India relied was that the 'weak' Tigers would be cowed by its superior military might. When the Tigers called this 'bluff' by risking confrontation in October 1987 India had to back off or escalate force. It chose the latter and finds itself in the present predicament. Again the most obvious example is that of Lyndon Johnson's unsuccessful use of air power against Hanoi in 1965.

The contours of a particular situation are seldom transparent to the decision maker. In the absence of the necessary condition even a superpower can fail to brow-beat a weak opponent and find itself drawn into a prolonged conflict.

There are three conditions of crucial importance:-

1. the coercing power must create in the opponents mind a sense of urgency for compliance with its demand;
2. a belief that the coercing power is more highly motivated to achieve its stated demand than the opponent is to oppose it;
3. a fear of unacceptable escalation if the demand is not accepted.

Apart from these objective conditions there are other salient aspects of compellance strategy to be taken note of. Coercive diplomacy deals with relative power under specific circumstances. Assessing that power relationship is a calculatively perceptive function. The party exercising coercive diplomacy cannot have full control because a great deal is dependent on the image of the situation that the other side develops and conclusions reached. The importance of timing is essential to this type of diplomacy. An opponent must be permitted the opportunity to digest the situation as presented to him before choosing his answers. If a reasonable amount of time is not provided his response may be reckless and ill-considered. The responsibility for the pacing of events, determining the appropriate sense of urgency and clear communications must be assumed by the party adopting this strategy.

The demand made of the opponent should not be great. If too much is demanded the opponent's motivation not to comply may be re-inforced; since the strategy is context-dependent careful consideration must always be given to the circumstances, known and unknown to the actors involved contributing to the course of events. There should be continuous evaluation, and momentum of events should be slowed down to give the opponent time to digest the signals given. The opponent must be given time to appraise the evolving situation and respond appropriately. Most importantly the opponent must be left with a way out of the crisis. Another mistake is to assume greater motivation than the opponent. Also, solely relying on threats of punishment for non-compliance instead of offering incentives for compliance is also a mistake.

There are different type of coercive diplomacy. In the case of India vis-a-vis the LTTE the variant was of three components. The first was the ultimatum in New Delhi. The essence of which was eloquently publicised by Mr Prabakaran in the historic speech at the Suthumala Amman Temple. In this case the ultimatum was more of a definite, demanding pronouncement. Thereafter India followed a 'try and see' approach without exerting direct pressure. The third was of gradual 'turning of the screw' element. The arming of other militant groups, the opening of large number of camps etc were part of this strategy. In the case of the LTTE the rapid pace of events 'stunned' it. In the initial stages all three objective conditions seemed applicable and it appeared that India had tamed the Tigers. After a respite however the initial success of the Indian Government began to wear thin. The try and see cum turn on the screws strategy was becoming counter-productive. A number of issues ranging from the security of the Tigers to on-going colonisation, shortfall in devolution etc. began to frop up. The Tiger self-perception was that the safe future of both the community as well as their organisation was at stake. The Tigers were developing an image of the situation that was totally at variant with India's conclusions. No meaningful attempt was made by the Indian political, diplomatic and military authorities to evaluate the situation. Instead some Indian authorities began to develop an antagonistic approach; from the preliminary stages some of the provisions of the accord were being thrust upon the Tigers without giving them adequate time to digest those. There was perhaps a delayed reaction to this. Also the pacing of events was too fast and communications between the LTTE and Indian channels suffered. The Tiger perception was that too much was being demanded of them. Their motivation of no-compliance with the Indian demand began to be strengthened. The respite of August and Sep '87 during which New Delhi seemed incapable of forcing the pace on issues which Colombo was obliged to deliver, also helped decrease the sense of urgency in the Tiger psyche. Secondly the Tigers in the belief that both the future of the Tamil people as well as the LTTE's was at stake found their motivation in defying India exceeding the co-ercing powers motives. Thirdly it was to the LTTE's advantage in terms of capturing the hearts and minds of the Tamil people if India escalated action. The Tigers also felt as the vast number of Tamil people did that India would not inflict damage on the Tamil people if India escalated action. The Tigers also felt as the vast number of Tamil people did that India would not inflict damage on the Tamil people and any military action would not be prolonged because of domestic Tamil Nadu pressure. With the three objective conditions conducive for the success of coercive diplomacy being no longer valid in the Tiger perception the temporary triumph of the Indian compliance strategy diminished. India chose to escalate force rather than restrain itself through humanitarian concern for the Sri Lankan Tamils who after all had not wronged India in any manner. There seemed a possibility of repairing the deteriorating relationship between India and the Tigers after Thileepan's death fast. This was when India offered an incentive in the form of controlling the interim administration. The carrot proved worthless in a short period in LTTE eyes as they could not

determine the composition of the interim administration. Shortly faced with the inability of securing the release of their stalwarts the Tigers soon indulged in dangerous brinkmanship resulting in war. In the early stages several attempts were made by both the LTTE and Tamil organisations to sue for peace. The rigid stance of India and their refusal to grant a way out for the Tigers saw a hardening of attitude, both in the LTTE as well as the community.

It is relevant to take cognizance of another historic example where the application of coercive diplomacy failed namely U.S. - Japan relations from 1938-1941. Japanese economic and military expansion with the avowed objective of creating the "greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere" troubled the U.S.A.. The American response to Japanese expansion was an embargo on certain goods and a cancellation of credits in 1939. Later the Japanese-American commercial treaty was abrogated. The purpose was to restrain and moderate Japan's policies through economic punishment. This policy of co-ercive diplomacy was not very precise. The U.S.A. continued to send conflicting signals and in mid 1940 imposed several new embargo. Rather than make compliance attractive the stepped-up pressure boomeranged weakening the moderates within the Japanese cabinet and making that government more determined to acquire secure and independent sources of raw materials. In July 1941 the U.S.A. imposed a total embargo on oil and froze Japanese assets in American banks. In November Japan was presented with demands including withdrawal from occupied territories, repudiation of the tripartite pact and an end to expansion. Faced with nightmares of economic strangulation Japan chose the alternative war with the U.S.A.. Pearl Harbour in this sense was a rational response to the choice posed by the American ultimatum, for the alternative - acceptance of U.S. demands was even more unpalatable than war with a stronger opponent with the outcome possessing an element of uncertainty.

The Japanese decision was not a hasty one. Unable to understand that Japan would not suddenly reverse long-held values and beliefs and agree under pressure to dismantle ten years of expansion, the U.S. government simply re-inforced Japanese attitudes about the world. The few carrots offered by the U.S.A. to encourage compliance - most favour nation status and a mutual non-aggression treaty did affect Japanese motivation or their analysis of costs and benefits. Japanese counter-proposals were bluntly rejected in Washington thereby preventing any chance of compromise. The situation developed its own dynamics beyond the control of either country and war was inevitable. The U.S. policies failed because core values held by the Japanese were non-negotiable and American demands merely increased their intransigence.

In the case of the Tigers they had more at stake in the North and East than India. Indian indifference and lethargy along with counter-weighting pressure tactics only helped re-inforce the Tiger perception of a grand Indian conspiracy to destroy their movement and deprive the Tamil community of their legitimate aspirations. Indian insensitivity bordering on arrogance to the evolving LTTE view-

point exacerbated matters and headed on collision course. Faced with a recalcitrant opponent the seemingly inexpensive policy deteriorated when challenges were accepted and military action was taken

The Guerilla War

The on-going conflict between the Indian Army and the LTTE is worthy of analysis on criteria based on strategy, objectives and tactics rather than simplified assessment focussing on the knitty-gritty the nuts and bolts of day-to-day combat. A theoretical understanding of the type of war being waged and the issues involved should be obtained at least on a minimal level if the implication and ramifications are to be comprehended.

Let us take the Indian Army first. A brief chronological sketch of the army's military operations would be as follows (from the army's perspective). The army laid the groundwork by establishing camps in strategic positions in the interior of Tamil countryside. When the operation started it conducted "Pawan" aimed at gaining control of Jaffna town. This took six weeks. Thereafter it pacified the peninsula and the Islands. In the Eastern Province it undertook "operation catchet". Unlike in the North civilian casualties were minimal and the public relations image with the help of the different socio-political environment prevailing in the East the army was able to establish optimum control.

In the North the year 1988 saw the theatre of war being the Wannu area. Various operations codenamed Virat, Thrishod, Checkmate etc. were staged there. The peninsula saw military engagements declining. In 1989 there was a fresh spurt of activity in the peninsula by the Tigers to which the Indian army responded. The conflict escalated in the Wannu. Sporadic incidents occurred in the East too. On a politico-military level the Indian army was able to restore facilities like transport, and help conduct three elections with its attendant defects and a low turn-out. It helps maintain an 'elected' council of a 'unified' province with minimal devolution on paper. If the council works then the Indian army would have scored a substantial political victory. A chronological sketch from the LTTE would be as follows: The LTTE fought like a conventional army adopting positional warfare in the defence of Jaffna town from Oct 10th to 25th. Thereafter it made a transition in its organisational make-up reverting back to classical guerilla tactics. By 1988 the LTTE had made the Wannu their operational base. The headquarters and the leader Mr Prabaharan were located there. the LTTE during the greater part of the year adopted evasive tactics resorting to strategic defensive only when the need arose. The beginning of this year saw the LTTE stepping up activities to the point of directly confronting the Indian forces in the peninsula. Conflict escalated in the Wannu and to a limited extent it seems that the LTTE had registered success in the military sphere by way of increased manpower including training for new recruits. It has also kept supply lines open despite joint patrolling by the Indo-Lankan navies to procure arms and ammunition. On a political level the Tamil community is deeply divided with the greater part of the North and significant sections of the East being estranged from the IPKF which in an indirect

Tiger political victory. While retaining a support base the LTTE has also circumscribed the civil administration, paralysing certain departments. In elections the Tigers were not able to disrupt it but they effectively discouraged a higher voter turn-out and helped swing the limited voting in favour of the EROS. Also they have to a great extent reduced the credibility of the new provincial administration which remains a non-starter yet. If the council works well concentrating on rehabilitation it would help undermine the present Tiger population.

The important question that arises is the objective and strategy of the combatants. A myth that prevails in some quarters is that the Indian Army which suffered a lot in operation Pawan was unprepared for it never expected a conflict. A cursory examination of the Indian media shows otherwise. Dilip Bobb in the 'India Today' quotes a General that operation Pawan was part of carefully-crafted, long term strategic planning which included the possibility of high casualties in the initial stages of the operation. "Admittedly we expected the LTTE to be less intransigent and more in our control. In that sense we miscalculated. But the prospect of the Indian army having to take on the LTTE militarily was an option in our projection" the General says. External Affairs State Minister K. Natwar Singh an Indian Foreign Service stalwart himself says "No government can go into an agreement of this nature without having tied up the obvious loose ends. We examined every possible option. There were no low-cost options available".

It is important also to realise that while India envisaged conflict with it had seriously underestimated the LTTE motivation, fighting capabilities, capacity for self-sacrifice and above all the close relationship between the fighters and the people. The codename Pawan (gust of wind) and the 120hr deadline in the accord suggests that the initial expectation of the Indian army was a swift surgical strike. Even after "Pawan", views expressed in the Indian media suggested that the LTTE was no longer a major threat and it was a matter of time before it surrendered. The short-term plan was to bend and not break" the LTTE. Although a Vietnam-Afghanistan type situation was ruled out the possibility of an indefinite stay was taken into account. In the initial stages several Tigers were arrested and released. Later they were kept in custody. At a point the directive was to take no prisoners in altercations. At present the target seems the hierarchy for it is felt that the movement would collapse and surrender. Even if this succeeds it could be counterproductive and therefore a dangerous gamble. In the final analysis it is felt that continuous military pressure and increasing marginalisation in the political process would bend the Tigers. The problem here if we are to amplify the Pawan wind metaphor the Palmyrah tree (a metaphor for Tamils) sways in the wind but does not bend like the reed, it would rather break.

The Indian objective and strategy differs vastly from the Tiger perspective. As in the case of asymmetrical conflict the Indians see the conflict as limited while the Tigers see it as total. The former regards what is at stake as limited while the latter views it as virtually without limits. Most

conflicts between stronger and weaker sides are of this type. In insurgency conflicts where the weaker side fights for independence the perception is that their very existence is at stake. In such situations the weaker side can make unlimited demands on their people. The weaker side wages a war of attrition exacting prolonged, mounting sacrifices. This is the situation prevailing in the North-East. India's avowed intention of bringing the Tigers into the mainstream by adopting a military strategy will not work until and unless the Tigers themselves change their attitude, for adopting a military strategy would only alienate the general population and stiffen the Tiger resolve. It is useful to examine the overall situation of guerilla warfare and the significant advance made by the LTTE from the time of the accord up to the present.

The aim of the Tigers is not the overall military defeat of the Indian forces. It is not even equalisation of military capabilities. These are impossible targets against the fourth largest army. What is possible is string of operations like landmines, ambushes and limited face-to-face confrontations. The induction of other Tamil militant groups in the fighting as Indian allies has only expanded the spectrum of Tiger targets. The abuse and misuse of power by these groups running the nominal North-East administration and the anti-people activities have alienated them from the Tamil people. Their image in the Tamil peoples eyes is that of an extension or projection of the Indian military machine. As such the Tiger objective is simplified into continuous operations and prevention of civil administration. Yet the holding of elections under flawed circumstances is certainly a set-back to the LTTE. As Che Guevara says "Where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted". The LTTE objection to participation in the elections stems from this basic fact. As mentioned earlier the conduct of the new administration, the central government's non-cooperation in making the council workable, the cautious attitude of the EROS as well as the apathy of the Tamil public has blunted the impact of the fraudulent elections in the Tamil areas.

If the LTTE target is not military victory what then is the objective? Prolonging the conflict without being completely routed. To do so the LTTE guerilla would function politically and militarily.

Politically this task would be to aggravate social and political dissension, raise levels of political consciousness and revolutionary will and also intensifying popular opposition to the regime and hastening the process of its dissolution. In this case the LTTE finds an easy identifiable political target in the pro-Indian administration seen as a puppet of New Delhi's regional hegemonism.

Militarily the Tiger Guerilla's tactics are to wear the enemy down, chip away at the morale of troops and induce maximum expenditure of money, material and manpower in the suppressive effort. Simultaneously the Tigers will replenish their own forces through capture and purchase of arms and recruitment from an increasingly alienated

population. Once guerilla activity starts most states resort to repressive measures which deepen popular opposition creating a vicious circle of rebellion and repression. The expectation of many that India would adopt an enlightened attitude in combatting the Tigers proved futile. Also India is unable to unleash a full-fledged no holds barred offensive on the Tamil people because of Tamil Nadu sentiments domestic political opposition and international opinion.

The situation at the time of the accord was one which India was topping the popularity poll in the Tamil areas. A conflict with the LTTE at that stage would have seen a majority of the Tamil people on the Indian side. What the LTTE needed at that point was time. The Tigers instead of doing battle initially gave time to the Indians to deliver the years. When it was found that India was not delivering Tamil expectations during Aug-Sep a lot of Tamils were dis-illusioned and felt that they and the Tigers had received a raw deal, so time was opportune for Tigers to fight. Even then the Tigers without holding on to territory ceded the Peninsula. By this the Tigers traded **space** for **time**. The time was necessary not only for political mobilization but also to allow the inherent weaknesses of the Indian troops to develop under stress of war. The contradiction between Tamil people and the Indian troops was acutely sharpened. The **time** was used to produce **will**. The revolutionary will necessary to endure suffering and the psychological capacity to resist defeat. The continuing urban guerilla tactics in the peninsula as well as the election results show that the revolutionary will to resist India has evolved to a great degree. Trading **space** for **time** to yield **will** in a lesson drawn from Mao-Tse-Tung.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT TERMINATION

India for the first time in its post-independent history is embroiled in a low-intensity war. In doing so the mandarins of policy in New Delhi have chosen to ignore the fact that the objective is a complete turn-about to its earlier position that there was no military solution to a fundamentally political problem.

The question to be addressed at this stage is that of terminating the conflict let us take the LTTE first as their position seems simple and less ambiguous. The LTTE as well as the 'Eelam' Tamils do not have fundamental objections to India's supremacy assertion in the region as long as the legitimate aspirations of the Tamils are not crushed. Although the rhetoric that emanates from Tamil quarters is fiercely anti-Indian it is more a case of positional verbosity. In the long term there is a congruence of interests between the Tamils and India. The basic position of the LTTE has been that of asking India to declare an indefinite ceasefire and then initiate talks without pre-conditions. A large number of Tamils would accept this position.

On the other hand India has been maintaining the basic line that there would be no indefinite cease-fire and that the Tigers should lay down their arms first. Even the short-term ceasefires declared have been for surrendering arms.

In effect what India requires is a virtual surrender of the LTTE. The regional superpower asserting its dominance in the region has been checked militarily by the LTTE. Defiance of the super power has its own consequences. Recent events have produced two explicit signs of LTTE flexibility and Indian rigidity. The Sri Lankan government's offer of talks has been accepted by the Tigers while India did not extend the ceasefire initiated by Colombo in the Tamil areas. Robert Macnamara is credited with the statement "Today there is no longer any such thing as military strategy. There is only crisis management".

India has allowed the situation to deteriorate further by not introducing appropriate crisis management techniques. The rigid position of demanding an unconditional surrender does not leave the LTTE a way out through a face-saving option. It is both a failure of coercive diplomacy as well as crisis management. A cardinal principle in the management of crisis selecting diplomatic-military options that leave the opponent a way out of the crisis that is compatible with his fundamental interests. The Tigers have been denied this opportunity by India.

There are six other basic requirements outlined by crisis management experts to prevent war from erupting, from escalating and to reduce conflict and usher in peace. They are:

1. Maintaining top-level civilian control of military options. Of paramount importance to crisis management is top-level civilian control over the selection and timing of military actions. This is absent in Sri Lanka. There is no actual civilian top authority.
2. Creating pauses in the tempo of military actions. The military momentum is deliberately slowed down to provide time for diplomatic exchanges. In Sri Lanka the guerilla war does not leave the Indian army the sole option of regulating military activity. Yet even the temporary lulls are not backed-up with diplomatic action.
3. Co-ordinate diplomatic and military moves. All military moves undertaken should be carefully co-ordinated with political-diplomatic actions. The evidence on ground does not bear out this rule.
4. Confine military moves to those that constitute clear demonstrations of ones resolve and are appropriate to one's limited crisis objectives. Again this seemed lacking generally and particularly in the initial period.
5. Avoid military moves that give the opponent the impression that one is about to resort to large-scale warfare and therefore force him to consider pre-emption; the period between the accord and the outbreak of Indo-Tiger hostilities is proof of this rule being observed in the breach.
6. Choose diplomatic - military options that signal a desire to negotiate rather than to seek a military action. Most activities in the on-going conflict pertain to this rule.

One of the main problems in resolving the crisis seems to

be the lack of central co-ordination and even visible competition between the various organisations like the army, RAW, External Affairs Ministry and P.Min Secretariat within the military people who did not want a conflict with the Tigers like Gen. Harikirat Singh and Gen. Sirdesh Pandey have been eased out by the hawks.

An illustrative example of the above mentioned crisis-management principles being violated in Indo-Tiger conflict occurred in mid 1988; the Research and Analysis Wing conducts talks with Kittu in Madras. Almost all issues are finalised except for a few. Approval is sought from the Tiger leadership and Johnny is flown to the Wannai for consultations by the RAW. He is killed apparently by the army. Later the Indian P.M. informs the Sri Lankan President that LTTE has given indication of its willingness to lay down arms and work the accord. Mr Dixit tells Tamil citizens that only two issues remain outstanding. At this point the army starts Operation Checkmate saying it was a counterwaiting pressure tactic to facilitate negotiations; the Tigers interpret 'Checkmate' as a move to "trap the king". A hard-hitting statement calling the accord a 'character of servility' and threatened a prolonged guerilla war. India reacts by cracking-down on Kittu and 154 Tigers in Tamil Nadu thereby foreclosing the only remaining avenue to talk directly with the Tigers outside the arena of war.

The above example encapsulates the violation of all six principles of crisis management and illustrates clearly the reason for the breakdown of talks. Indeed the entire conflict is a sorry spectacle of visible failure of Indian co-ercive diplomacy and crisis management policies in a) preventing conflict, b) curbing conflict from escalating, c) reducing conflict, d) and terminating conflict.

There are also a few other factors standing in the way of ending the war. Once governments become involved in a war they often find it much more difficult to back out of it than they had imagined, even if they keenly regret having entered it; there are however different variables capable of prolonging wars or speeding their termination. State decision of continuing or terminating war and its ability to do either will be influenced by the personality of its leaders, its political structure, the role of military leaders and their ability to influence the decision-making process, the role of public opinion and organised interest groups.

There are however a few observations on the issue of terminating conflicts. The prestige of the Indian Army is a big stumbling block. The army is the cutting edge of Indian stridence. The initial decision of sending the army in may be an error but now the question is how to extricate itself with honour. The increasing, politicisation of the Indian Army, the emerging alternative contest of power to New Delhi within the country the Sikh crisis, border tensions and a weak and vacillating head of state have increased the army's clout. The world's fourth largest army representing the regional super power does not want to be humiliated. Moreover the martial race concept of North and Central India does not want the 'Madras' boys to win. Another factor would be the "sacrifice creates value" proposition. As the costs of war mounts the determination and resolve of

leaders and public opinion becomes strengthened to achieve objectives the war is waged for. A compromise settlement may be ruled out so that the sacrifices made should gain a justifiable outcome. But as war prolongs the mood may change to the other point of view that it was time to cut our losses.

The other factor blocking termination is the obstinate refusal on the part of the leaders who involved the country in a war that is proving to be increasingly disastrous to admit their mistake and seek a way out. Insistence on victory or peace with honour may be unconsciously reinforced by personal and partisan motives. Whatever the reason for a country to be involved in war the move to change the situation and terminate the conflict can gain momentum only through a change in leadership. The subjective factor of Mr Rajiv Gandhi is a moot point. His personal antipathy to Mr Prabaharan and "accord fetish" is a conflict prolonging factor.

In the last analysis the conflict could also be terminated through the exercise of public opinion and special interest groups in the dominant power waging war. This is particularly so in asymmetrical conflicts as in the case of U.S.A.-Vietnam. In the Tamil issue it is the domestic constituency of the Indian Government that could finally decide the outcome. All Tamils and others desiring to end the conflict should adopt measures aimed at harnessing public opinion and mobilising pressure groups. Apart from Tamil Nadu, domestic political opposition, intellectual and opinion circles should be approached. Unless the full implications of the 'dirty war' waged in the North-East is realised in India conflict termination would be a remote possibility.

CONCLUSION

The propository argument of this paper as indicated in the preamble is as follows:-

- (a) India has shown a vulgarly realistic non-perfectionist approach in dealing with the Tamils. The deploying of military force against the Tamils and its consequences have inflicted proportionately greater damage than the desired end. Methods less dubious avoiding destruction could have been adopted. Ethical and moral constraints were lacking.
- (b) The coercive diplomacy practices by India against the Tigers did not succeed because the objective conditions for exercising such diplomacy did not exist. Secondly, in practising such diplomacy several mistakes were made by the Indians. In such a context the Tiger reaction was inevitable to which the Indian response was escalated force.
- (c) The nature of guerilla war is such that India can never succeed in crushing the Tigers militarily without resolving the primary political problems. There is a possibility of a change only if the N.E. council works satisfactorily and basic Tamil aspirations are realised. Given Tiger opposition the chances are remote. Tiger co-operation may change things. A genuine settlement is possible only with LTTE's active participation in the democratic pro-

cess. Continuing with military measures will only alienate the Tamil people further and enhance support for the Tigers. On the other hand the Tigers do not seek to defeat India militarily but politically. Every day that the war continues is an indirect victory for the Tigers. The only possible outcome of the war is a military stalemate. Negotiation is the only answer to such a situation.

- (d) Even when the strategy of compellence failed, proper crisis management techniques could have avoided armed conflict. The failure of India's crisis managers led to the escalation of conflict. The absence of proper crisis management principles has led to the prolonging of the conflict hampering positive moves for termination of conflict.

There are two final observations. The first is in relation to the possible termination of the conflict. This is possible primarily through a change in the internal situation in India, with a general election in the offing the possibility of a regime change is there. A new prime minister who has the backing of the D.M.K. may find it easier to reverse India's approach without tarnishing the army or eroding India's prestige. If that does not occur the role of the D.M.K. assumes greater responsibility. Only that party can influence Delhi through agitation and/or negotiation to end the conflict.

Finally while understanding the predicament and position of the LTTE one would also like to point out in the words of Sun Tzu "There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefitted".

THE TREACHERY & FRAUD PERPETRATED ON TAMILS BY THE ACCORD

By R Kannuthurai, Urumpiray, Sri Lanka

Dear delegates,

I think you are placed in a better position to make a deep study, with a legal mind, into the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. There have been numerous incidents which make one suspect that the Accord was a conspiracy to achieve certain ulterior objectives favourable to the majority Sinhalese which will ultimately be helpful to India in the defence of the Indian ocean and other matters. The persons responsible in preparing the Accord were Mr J R Jayewardene, Mr Lalith Athulathmudali, Mr Rajiv Gandhi and Mr J N Dixit. This accord was prepared behind the back of the Tamils, especially the LTTE who were in control of the Tamil areas and recognised by the Tamil population as the only organisation that would liberate the Tamils and safeguard them. The main objective of India was to please JR by any means. The first half of the Accord looks rosy and nice, but section 2.16(C) nullifies all clauses mentioned earlier. The spirit of the Accord gives all powers to JR to have the Indian army under his control and use (or misuse) them as he liked. Hence the Accord gave JR the opportunity of wiping out the Tamil militant organisations and under that pretext kill Tamil civilians, destroy their houses and public buildings. Subsequent events prove that the policy followed was to suppress the Tamils socially, economically and educationally in every possible way so that the Tamil community dare not raise its head again and demand a separate homeland. That the Indian army collaborated closely and cooperated with Sri Lankan Government was evident in all their actions. Thus it could be seen that the Indian army did not come here to settle the ethnic dispute but to give effect to the conspiracy.

Before the Accord was prepared, Mr Puri, First Secretary of the Indian Embassy in Sri Lanka, met the LTTE 'boys', held their hands, and declared that India recognized the LTTE as the sole freedom fighters of the Tamils. A photo of this event appeared in the press also. Then, in order to induce the Tiger boys into their trap, Mr Rajiv Gandhi offered to appoint Prabakaran as Chief Minister of the Interim Administration. He was taken to Delhi, kept incommunicado and was well guarded. Not even his close associates were allowed to meet him. A copy of the Accord was given to him to read, but snatched away when he had read it halfway. When the Tamils in Sri Lanka protested against the detention of Prabakaran and held massive demonstrations, he was released. Mr Gandhi had given concrete assurances to Prabakaran on the safety and security of the Tamils, but we know he swallowed every word of his promise, since

Yet, the LTTE was on friendly terms with the Indian army and co-operated with them. Believing that permanent peace had come and peace was in sight, normal life began to take shape among the Tamils. When LTTE leaders Pulendran of Trincomalee and Kumarappa of Batticaloa got married (after a strenuous wait!) top Indian officers attended their wedding and gave presents.

The Sri Lankan Government was not happy at the turn of events. In connivance, the Indian Government which wanted Prabakaran to be the Chief Minister started going against every proposal made by the Tigers in the matter of selection of members for the Interim Administration. This was

deliberately done by both governments to prevent the Tigers from getting more power and influence. JR, having waited until the Tigers surrendered their weapons, and after granting amnesty to them, decided to provoke the Tigers into anti-Accord action, in every possible way. This was the understanding he had with the IPKF. After the IPKF established themselves in Trincomalee, JR started a massive colonisation scheme of Tamil areas with Sinhalese, using his army for support. IPKF did not take any action although they knew it was sufficient provocation for the Tamils to resort to violence. Mr Dixit could not do anything to prevent the colonisation. He made various false statements in order to camouflage the Indian army's inaction. He was telling deliberate lies.

As the situation was turning from bad to worse, one of the top leaders of the LTTE, Dileepan undertook a fast-unto-death (without taking even liquid). Mr Dixit, who had come to Jaffna during that period failed to see him, nor did he take any action. When thousands of Tamils protested and demonstrated, he made disparaging statements against the fast. Even when Dileepan died on the twelfth day of his fast, India did not take any action against the Sinhala colonisation.

In the meantime, Prabakaran wanted to remove all documents from his office in Madras. He sent Kumarappa and Pulendran (both married persons by then) with 15 men to bring the documents by boat. They informed the officers of the Indian army before they left, although it was not necessary in view of the general amnesty granted by the Accord. The information of the trip was given to Mr Dixit who consulted Mr Lalith Athulathmudali. A trap was laid to arrest them on the way. Sri Lankan navy caught them in the high seas and Indian navy took custody of them. The 17 men peacefully submitted themselves as they had nothing illegal to hide, except arms for personal safety. As soon as the men were arrested Lalith flew to New Delhi, spoke to Mr Rajiv Gandhi and brought an order from him that they should be handed over to the Sri Lankan authorities to take them to Colombo. The allegation that they were transporting illegal arms was made up long after Lalith returned from New Delhi and after the LTTE men committed suicide. Normally, when the Sri Lankan army seizes any arms from the LTTE, they make a hue and cry immediately and flash the news in the media. In this incident Rajiv Gandhi has committed a treacherous act with a view to pleasing JR. As a good number of the arrested men had dispensed with their suicide capsules after the amnesty, another LTTE leader gave them the cyanide capsules under the pretext of visiting them in captivity. And when the LTTE boys were about to be put in the plane to be taken to Colombo on JR's orders, they had no alternative but to swallow the poison and die. This proved to be a terrible and unbearable provocation to the Tigers. Rajiv and JR who were intentionally provoking them to commit violence so that they could retaliate and create a war situation, would have been very happy at this incident. The young Tamil youth could not bear it. Hot-blooded, they went into action. They went berserk and many Sinhalese were killed in various parts of the North-East province. RAW was suspected to have got this job done in order to provoke the Tamils, to enable them to start a war

against them. The 'peace-keeping' force who by that time already had tanks and artillery and heavy weapons ready at Palaly, came out and started attacking the Tamil people, irrespective of whether they were civilians or militants.

JR was the happiest man over the turn of events as he ultimately succeeded in provoking the Tiger boys to take up arms. Tamil people in Trincomalee and Batticaloa got into a rage on hearing of the death of their leaders Pulendran and Kumarappa. They started attacking the Sinhala colonists who were brought in recently. The new Indian army commander Lt.Gen.Kalkat gave instructions to his army to wage war on the Tamils, under the pretext of disarming the Tamil 'terrorists'. The IPKF only wanted some provocation to ignite the war and they started the war in full earnest at the first opportunity.

Unlike the method adopted by the Sri Lankan armies, the Indian army was cool and collected in their manner of killings. They had no motive to fight. They had to stage incidents whereby the Tiger boys were given opportunity to massacre a few or a small group of Indian soldiers and thereby rouse the feelings of fellow Indian soldiers who went into action. It is the concealed motive of the Indian army to wipe out the entire Tiger movement and their supporters. This is being done only to please the Sri Lankan Government and to get round its Sinhalese population. Young Indian soldiers were brought to be trained in guerrilla warfare in the jungles of Vanni. Practical training has been given to them, namely, to kill Tamils as they liked. Tamils became guinea-pigs for their training.

About 90 square miles of Tamil areas were forcibly taken by Sri Lankan army in Mullaitivu. More than 13,000 Tamils were chased out or killed in these operations, and their

houses demolished. Their cattle and goats were given to Muslim butchers for slaughtering. Today it has become a full-fledged Sinhalese colony, with the original owners,

Tamils, stranded as refugees elsewhere. IPKF did not do anything to rectify this wrong act done to the Tamils. The Mullaitivu Govt.Agent has ordered to give the Sinhalese settlers rations until they are comfortably accommodated. It is enough evidence that the IPKF is openly helping the Sinhala Government to achieve their well laid out policy. It will not be an overstatement if it is asserted that the Indian army will go out to work against the linkage of the North and East in the Referendum to be held on July 5. It is always easy to beat a fallen victim in order to obtain the favour of the victor. Time will decide. History will not fail to record the treachery and atrocities perpetrated by India on the Sri Lankan Tamils.

It is clear that JR has achieved all the purposes for which he entered into an agreement with India. Tamils will be confined to the Northern Province. Eastern Province will be absorbed by Sinhalese colonisation and the sea coast by Sinhalese fishermen. JR wanted to achieve this, and Rajiv helped him to achieve this.

JR is a far-sighted, shrewd and clever man, the wise old Fox. He was able to make a fool of Rajiv Gandhi and twisted him into committing himself to annihilate the Tamil race. One may even wish that the fate that befell General Dyer, the Britisher who massacred thousands of Indian freedom fighters at an enclosed meeting place, would befall these three men, Rajiv, JR and Dixit.

The Referendum of 5th July may seal the fate of the Tamils. Only God should help the Tamil man in Sri Lanka !

India's Abuse of its Regional Power Status

Siva N. Sivalingam

President, Tamil Eelam Society of Canada

India is an acknowledged regional power. But its conduct with respect to its smaller neighbours is high handed; reminiscent of her former colonial masters, and even down right mean. Its actions in Sri Lanka are unworthy of even a third grade nation. The reputation of India as a nation of high principles is seriously impaired.

For the Tamils 'Bharat' is a revered word. They see their origin - albeit 2000 years ago, their philosophy and their culture across the Palk strait. In the holy temples and sacred rivers they fulfilled their religious activities for centuries. For them the Palk Strait is a courier, not a barrier.

But, to their shock and dismay, India, a nation that achieved its goal of independence after a prolonged struggle, moved to crush the Tamil's struggle for freedom. Contrary to the morals and ideals enshrined in the great epics of India, the present leaders have betrayed their friends.

The Indian Pose

When India sent a flotilla loaded with medicine and food, under a red cross flag, it proclaimed to the world, that the cargo was meant for the civilian population of Tamil Eelam, wounded and starved, by the merciless military operation and economic blockade of the Sri Lankan government. And, when the gratuitous offer was turned back by Sri Lanka India acted again. This time the regional power gave no option to its tiny southern neighbour, and the food parcels were air dropped in a military style operation, thus violating all norms of international conventions.

There was a stunned silence in the international community. Throughout the episode, India insisted, it was only a reiteration of India's commitment to its humanitarian principles, and a demonstration of its intolerance to human rights violations in Sri Lanka. The Tamils of Eelam hailed India as their saviour and ally against the hostile Sri Lankan state!

The Hidden Intentions

There followed the notorious Accord in July 1987, which was purported to end the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka. As the Accord became public, and events unfolded, there emerged a conspiracy between India and Sri Lanka to crush the Tamil national struggle. This was apparent not only in the provisions of the Accord but also in the conduct of India and Sri Lanka since the Accord.

The Accord itself (section 2.16 A,B,C,D) provides for joint action to curb any emergence of Tamil strength, viz:

- Occupation of predominantly Tamil areas by Indian troops out of proportion for a peace keeping force.
- Establishment of military camps, mainly in the north where ethnic strife was least
- The demand for precocious surrender of arms by Tamil groups
- The Indian military operation to decimate L.T.T.E.,

the most dedicated champions of Eelam Tamil freedom struggle

- Instalment of quislings in power in Tamil areas
- Continued colonisation of traditional Tamil homelands by Sinhalese settlers

Tamils strength has been a potent force in Indian politics too, and it was no surprise that India connived with the then president of Sri Lanka. Its role of a saviour of the Tamils was a mere camouflage and most of us in the Tamil community bought it lock, stock and barrel.

Human Rights Violations by Indian Peace Keepers

India is now occupying the land of Tamil Eelam, with a force of more than 70,000 soldiers, for the last two years. With the flimsiest of excuse, it launched a military operation that has caused enormous damage in terms of life and property. There were more civilian deaths than during the Sri Lankan operations. There is ample evidence of human rights violations. Despite censorship and prevention of access to journalists, there are stories of, summary killings, torture, raping, extortion and harassment of innocent civilians. Refugees fleeing Sri Lanka have given eye witness accounts of the atrocities. India is today *Guilty of the same human rights violations* which it accused Sri Lanka of, and to justify its intervention there. It has no right to stay in Eelam as an occupying force. The Eelam Tamils never entered into any agreement with India nor were they a party to the Accord that was signed between Sri Lanka and India in July 1987.

International Obligation

The apparent apathy of the international community to the events in Sri Lanka is distressing but India is carrying out its gruesome acts under the cloak of a bilateral agreement. It cannot be said, that the world has no credible evidence of the Indian atrocities. The very fact that many countries throughout the world give refuge and protect large number of Tamils is by implication a recognition of the deplorable human rights situation in Sri Lanka.

The Indian propaganda machinery and their quislings have succeeded to a great extent to muffle the freedom struggle of Eelam Tamils. However, the Tamil Voice International, and the Eelam Tamil organisations across the world have kept the international institutions and individual countries informed of the heinous crime that is being perpetrated on their brethren.

India as an interested party, has lost its stature as a genuine mediator. Its presence in Sri Lanka has only aggravated the situation. Tamil and Sinhalese populations at large nor the present President of Sri Lanka have indicated any interest in the continued presence of Indian soldiers in Sri Lanka. It has to be replaced by either the Commonwealth or any other international peace keeping force, before any meaningful negotiations could be initiated towards a lasting peace in Sri Lanka.

தமிழ்த்தாய் வாழ்த்து

சீருடைச் செந்தமிழ் மகள் வாழி! எம்
சிந்தையில் நிறைந்தே அவள் வாழி!

போருடைப் புறமும் அன்புடை அகமும்
போர்த்த பேரழகாள் புகழ் வாழி!

ஆரமாய் இயலொடு தேனிசை நாடகம்
அணிந்தவள் சங்கம் தனில் ஊறிச்

சாரமாய் வடிந்த காவியச் சோலையில்
களி நடம் பயின்றவள் பேர் வாழி!

ஏருடை நிலமும் காருடை வளமும்
தாருடை அரசும் இல்லாமல்

பாரெலாம் அலையும் தமிழரை இணைத்தே
வீறுடைச் செல்வியாய் அவள் வாழி!

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குறள் எனும் முடி கொண்ட தமிழ் மகளே- ஒரு
குவலயப் புகழ் கொண்ட மொழி மலரே!

இறைமை கொள் இளமை கொண்டவளே-உயிர்
இனித்திட அணைத்திடும் இனியவளே!

குறிஞ்சியும் முல்லையும் நெய்தலும் மருதமும்
பிரிந்தவர் பாலையும் கொண்ட அகம்

எறிந்தவர் வேலினை ஏந்திய நெஞ்சுடன்
சரிந்தவர் போர் மறம் பேசும் புறம்

இலக்கியச் செழிப்புடன் இலக்கணச் செறிவும்
துலக்கிடும் பெட்டகம் ஆனவளே!

உயிர்க்கலை அறிவும் உலகியல் நுண்மையும்
பயின்றிடும் பெருமை கண்டவளே!

ஆட்சியும் அரசும் அறஞ்செறி மானமும்
மாட்சியாய் மதித்தவர் மாதரசே!

வீழ்ச்சியில் வீழ்ந்து போன உன் குடிகளை
ஆட்சியில் அமர்த்திட அருள் மகளே!

புலவர் சிவானந்தன்